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Executive Summary
The authors revisit the effect of the “Eco-Patent
Commons” (EcoPC) on the diffusion of patented
environmentally friendly technologies following
its discontinuation in 2016. Established in January
2008 by several large multinational companies,
the not-for-profit initiative provided royaltyfree access to 248 patents covering 94 “green”
inventions. In previous work, Bronwyn Hall
and Christian Helmers (2013) suggested that
the patents pledged to the commons had the
potential to encourage the diffusion of valuable
environmentally friendly technologies. The
updated results in this paper now show that
the commons did not increase the diffusion of
pledged inventions, and that the EcoPC suffered
from a number of structural and organizational
issues. The authors hope these findings will inform
future efforts to make environmentally friendly
technologies more broadly available for use.

Introduction
Although patents give their owners the right
to exclude others from practising a patented
technology, or to charge them for the privilege
of doing so, an increasing number of firms have
begun to make voluntary pledges intended to
limit their ability to enforce their patents to the
fullest degree (Contreras 2015). Yet the pledging
of patents, even to the extent that they will not
be asserted against infringers, stops short of
abandoning or contributing them to the public
domain.1 Thus, under a pledge model, patent assets
are retained by their owners, who continue to
incur maintenance and other fees, but the offensive
use of such patents is significantly curtailed.
Patent pledges are made for a variety of reasons,
including the promotion of broad product
interoperability through common technical
standards, the advocacy of new technology

1

Several large patent holders, including IBM, have a well-articulated
strategy for abandoning unused patents (Crouch 2012). Other
coordinated industry efforts, in particular in the biomedical sector, have
contributed substantial intellectual property (IP) assets to the public
domain for a variety of reasons (Contreras 2014).

platforms and the pursuit of social goals (ibid.).
Over the past few decades, significant patent
pledges have been made in areas such as opensource software (for example, IBM, Sun, Google
and Red Hat have each pledged that they will not
assert hundreds of patents against open-source
software implementations), electric vehicles
(Tesla’s famous proclamation that “all our patents
are belong to you” [sic]), and biotechnology (for
example, Monsanto’s pledge not to assert patents
covering genetically modified seeds against
farmers inadvertently growing them) (Contreras
2015; Reynolds, Contreras and Sarnoff 2017).
The EcoPC was an innovative not-for-profit
initiative undertaken by a group of large
industrial firms with the goal of pledging “green
technology” patents for broad, royalty-free use
in addressing environmental challenges. The 13
EcoPC participants collectively pledged a total of
248 “green technology” patents (94 priority patents
or distinct inventions) to the EcoPC between its
formation in 2008 and its discontinuation in 2016.
The EcoPC had the ambitious objective of
promoting the diffusion of green technologies to
increase and accelerate adoption and to encourage
follow-on innovation. Following its creation, the
EcoPC attracted substantial attention in both the
scholarly literature (Mattioli 2012; Hall and Helmers
2013; Awad 2015; Contreras 2015) and the popular
media (Tripsas 2009). In addition to accolades,
the EcoPC attracted some skepticism regarding
its potential effectiveness. The skepticism focused
on whether such a commons could offer sufficient
incentives to attract valuable patent pledges and
thereby achieve its ambitious goals. In contrast to
other mechanisms designed to share patents, such
as cross-licensing and patent pools, patent owners
in the EcoPC committed to maintain ownership
of their patents, which is costly, while making
those patents freely accessible to third parties,
including competitors.2 For these reasons, it was
not obvious what benefits the commons offered
to participants beyond reputational enhancement.
This in turn meant that participants could have
had incentives to minimize their costs by pledging
only patents with little commercial value and
allowing them to lapse shortly after they were
pledged. A second possible benefit might be that

2

Some competitive safeguards were left in place, notably a defensive
termination right in case a different patent was asserted against the
pledger by another firm using the patented technology.
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those building on these technologies might find
other (commercial) outputs of the contributing
firm useful, or might add to a knowledge
base from which the firm would benefit.3
In an earlier study (Hall and Helmers 2013), two of
the authors of this paper studied the characteristics
of the patents pledged to the EcoPC. This study
confirmed that the pledged patents did claim
environmentally friendly technologies. Moreover,
pledged patents were of similar value to other
patents in the pledging firm’s portfolio, but of
lower value than other patents in their class,
using the usual patent value indicators (based
on citations, family size, number of International
Patent Classifications [IPCs], etc.). The findings
suggested that the EcoPC participants had in
fact pledged patents with the potential to diffuse
environmentally friendly technologies that were
potentially useful, but there was little evidence
of such diffusion in the patent data itself.
In order to study whether the EcoPC increased
the diffusion of green technologies, Hall and
Helmers (2013) looked for changes in forward
citations to pledged patents following their
addition to the commons. They constructed a set
of control patents that matched the publication
authorities, priority years and IPC classes of the
EcoPC patents, adding to these control patents all
their equivalents, that is, the filings that shared
a priority application with them. They examined
the pattern of citations by subsequent patent
applications to the set of EcoPC patents and their
controls over time, before and after contribution,
and found that the EcoPC patents tended to be
cited less than the patents in the control group
before contribution to the EcoPC. However, the
results after contribution were inconclusive,
because most of the patents were contributed in
late 2008 and there was little data post-pledge as
citation data was available only through early 2012.
In the current study, the authors revisit the effect
of the EcoPC on technology diffusion and assess
its impact more broadly, using two different
approaches. The first is a set of interviews with
participants in the EcoPC and those responsible for
it, described in the “Qualitative Analysis” section.
The second is an updated look at the data on the
patents pledged to the EcoPC, described mainly
3

2

Sharon Belenzon (2006) showed that focal firm citations to patents are
positively valued by the market, suggesting this kind of feedback effect
from others’ use of the firm’s technology.

in the fourth and fifth sections. With the passage
of time, more citation data has become available
(through 2016, as opposed to early 2012 in Hall and
Helmers [2013]). This allows the authors of this
paper to re-examine the data and provide a more
definitive answer to the question of whether the
commons had any effect on technology diffusion.
The fact that the commons was discontinued
in 2016 also motivates the authors to revisit the
viability of such patent commons more generally.
To summarize the paper’s main findings, the
authors do not find any evidence that the EcoPC
increased the diffusion of pledged patents. Pledged
patents are cited less than the matched control
patents before they enter the commons and
their pledge does not change this. Looking at the
EcoPC priority patents, 82 percent had lapsed by
July 2017 due to expiration (26 percent), rejection
or withdrawal (18 percent), or nonpayment
of renewal fees (38 percent). This indicates
that participating companies, in most cases,
did not consider the benefits of the commons
sufficiently large to maintain the patents in force,
and expired patents were not replaced by new
patent pledges. The authors’ interviews with
representatives of the EcoPC participants reveal
several common critiques of the EcoPC’s structure
and operational processes, in particular its inability
to provide information regarding the usage of
contributed technologies.4 These are discussed
in greater detail in the third section, below.
This study both updates the authors’ previous
work and fills gaps in the understanding
of the functioning and performance of the
EcoPC and patent commons more generally.
Providing a definitive answer to the question
of diffusion, and the functioning of the EcoPC
more broadly, is important for several reasons.
First, it offers insight regarding the manner in
which patent pledges can support the diffusion
and implementation of (green) technologies
around the world. Second, it can inform the
design of other pledge communities, in both the
environmental space and other key technology
areas, such as biotechnology and agriculture.
The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows. The next section reviews the institutional
design and history of the EcoPC. The “Findings”
4

This feature also limits the authors’ ability to study their subsequent use,
which is why the authors chose to focus on citations to these patents,
which is public data.
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section summarizes the results from the authors’
interviews of participants in the EcoPC. In the
“Data” and “Empirical Results” sections, the
authors turn to an updated quantitative analysis of
these patents and their citations. The last section
offers conclusions in the form of a few lessons
that emerge from the authors’ analysis for the
design and functioning of patent commons.

The Eco-Patent Commons:
Structure and Development 5
The conception of the EcoPC as a collective
mechanism for permitting broad usage of patents
covering environmental technologies was originally
developed by IBM in the mid-2000s as one of
several corporate initiatives directed toward
environmental protection and sustainability (IBM
2010). Given IBM’s well-known patent strength,6 a
program to promote environmental causes would
capitalize on one of the company’s principal assets.
As noted above, IBM had already made significant
commitments to the sharing of patents and
other IP in the area of open-source code software
(Merges 2004; Wen, Ceccagnoli and Forman
2013; Contreras 2015). Accordingly, extending
these initiatives to the environmental area was
consistent with IBM’s existing corporate culture.7
The animating theory behind the EcoPC is that
industrial firms with large patent portfolios
likely hold patents covering technologies with
environmental applications, but because those
technologies are not core to the firms’ business,
they are languishing unused. If, however, the
patents covering these technologies could be made

5

The material in this section is derived from the works cited and the
interviews described in the “Findings” section. Additional information
regarding the organization and history of the EcoPC can be found in
Mattioli (2012), Hall and Helmers (2013) and Awad (2015).

6

According to statistics from the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
IBM regularly receives more US patent grants than any other company in
the world (about 7,000 to 9,000 patents per year in 2014–2017).

7

The EcoPC explicitly compared itself to the open-source movement,
noting in its promotional materials, “As has been demonstrated by the
open source software community, the free sharing of knowledge can
provide a fertile ground for new collaboration and innovation. Sharing
environmental patents can help others become more eco-efficient
and operate in a more environmentally sustainable manner, enabling
technology innovation to meet social innovation” (EcoPC 2017).

freely available to users around the world, then a
significant public service could be rendered at a
minimal cost to the patent holder. Thus, the hope is
not that the patent holder will find a “Rembrandt in
the attic” that will render it a substantial financial
return, but that it will find a box of old baby clothes
that could benefit others at little cost to the owner.8
IBM publicly announced the concept for the EcoPC
at its Global Innovation Outlook conference in
2006 (IBM 2008). The company then initiated
discussions with other large firms with which it
had existing business ties and which it believed
might be sympathetic to a collective approach to
making environmental technologies more broadly
available. In January 2008, IBM announced the
launch of the EcoPC together with Nokia, Pitney
Bowes and Sony (IBM 2008). A total of 13 firms
joined the EcoPC as summarized in Table 1. The
stated mission of the EcoPC was “to manage a
collection of patents pledged for unencumbered
use by companies and intellectual property rights
holders around the world to make it easier and
faster to innovate and implement industrial
processes that improve and protect the global
environment” (EcoPC 2013). Accordingly, patents
eligible for inclusion in the EcoPC were required
to belong to one of 60 enumerated IPC codes9
relating to environmental or sustainability
technology. Technologies sought by the EcoPC
included those aimed at energy conservation,
pollution control, environmentally friendly
materials, water or materials use or reduction
and recyclability (EcoPC 2013). As discussed in
greater detail in the “Empirical Results” section,
below, 248 patents were pledged to the EcoPC,
with the last such contribution occurring in 2011.10
To pledge a patent to the EcoPC, the owner
was required to make an irrevocable covenant
not to assert the patent — or “any worldwide
counterparts” (EcoPC 2013) — against any infringing
machine, manufacture, process or composition
of matter that “reduces/eliminates natural
resource consumption, reduces/eliminates waste
generation or pollution, or otherwise provides
8

See Rivette and Kline (2000), using IBM as an example of a firm that has
extracted significant financial value from licensing otherwise “unused” patents.

9

The IPC system was established by the 1971 Strasbourg Agreement
Concerning the International Patent Classification. It divides technologies
into eight principal sections with approximately 70,000 subcategories.

10 This number is arrived at as follows: there were 238 patents pledged at
the time of the authors’ work in Hall and Helmers (2013). Since then,
Hewlett-Packard added nine and Hitachi added one, for a total of 248.
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Table 1: Firm Participation in the EcoPC
Firm

Date Joining EcoPC

Number of Patents Pledged*

IBM

January 14, 2008

29

Nokia

January 14, 2008

1

Pitney Bowes

January 14, 2008

2

Sony

January 14, 2008

4

Bosch

September 8, 2008

24

DuPont**

September 8, 2008

11

Xerox

September 8, 2008

13

Taisei

March 23, 2009

2

Ricoh

March 23, 2009

1

Dow

October 20, 2009

1

Fuji Xerox

October 20, 2009

2

Hewlett-Packard

July 1, 2010

3

Hitachi**

July 25, 2011

1

* Priority patents (patent families)
** DuPont and Hitachi withdrew from the EcoPC in 2013, as of the transfer of management from the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) to the Environmental Law Institute (ELI).
Source: EcoPC 2013b, 2017 and ecopatentcommons.org.

environmental benefit(s)” (EcoPC 2013). This being
said, contributing patent owners retained the
right to assert pledged patents against any EcoPC
participant that asserted any environmental
patent against them, or any non-EcoPC participant
that asserted any patent against them (ibid.).11
The initial administrator of the EcoPC was the
WBCSD, a Geneva-based non-governmental
organization focused on environmental and
sustainability issues. The WBCSD is supported
in part by dues paid by corporate members. As a
significant member of the WBCSD, IBM persuaded
the organization to serve as the focal point for
the EcoPC. The WBCSD’s initial duties in this
regard consisted primarily of hosting the EcoPC
website and promoting the EcoPC to other WBCSD
members for recruitment purposes. The WBCSD
publicized the EcoPC among its members and
attracted several of the participants that joined
following the EcoPC’s formation (see Table 1).

11 This is a so-called “defensive termination” provision.

4

Participation in the EcoPC was open to all
individuals and companies in the world; the only
requirement for participation was the pledging
of one or more patents according to the EcoPC’s
rules.12 Neither membership in the WBCSD nor
any additional dues or charges were required
for EcoPC participation, a characteristic that
some have identified as a weakness of the EcoPC
(see the “Findings” section, below). The EcoPC
itself was characterized as an unincorporated,
non-profit association (EcoPC 2013).
Alhough various governance procedures are
built into the EcoPC’s ground rules, it appears
that few of these procedures were actually
observed in practice. For example, the ground
rules provide for an executive board charged
with management and leadership of the group.
Executive board members were to be appointed
based on a majority vote of EcoPC members
for two-year terms and were supposed to meet

12 Members of the EcoPC were required to complete a membership
application/pledge form, which bound them to comply with the EcoPC’s
non-assertion pledge, ground rules and governance structure (EcoPC 2013a).
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quarterly by telephone and annually in person.
However, of those individuals that the authors of
this paper interviewed, none recalled voting on
EcoPC-related matters and they recalled only a
handful of telephone conferences and no in-person
meetings. In effect, the EcoPC appears to have been
managed in a minimal manner by the WBCSD, with
business-related decisions made largely by IBM.
In 2013, the administration of the EcoPC was
transferred from the WBCSD to the ELI, a
Washington, DC-based trade and advocacy
organization. This transition was apparently
orchestrated by IBM, which had withdrawn as a
member of the WBCSD, thereby eliminating the
primary driver of the WBCSD’s involvement. The
WBCSD had also begun to view the EcoPC — which
could be seen as treating patents as obstacles to be
overcome in promoting sustainable development
— as misaligned with the generally pro-IP stance
of many of its members. The WBCSD thus willingly
parted with the EcoPC after IBM’s withdrawal
from the organization. The ELI, of which IBM was a
significant member, hosted the EcoPC website from
2013 through 2016, but was not actively engaged in
recruiting new participants. Two members, Hitachi
and DuPont, withdrew from the EcoPC at the
time of this administrative shift. No new patents
were contributed to the EcoPC after 2011, when
Hitachi joined. By 2016, very little activity was
occurring at the EcoPC. Accordingly, in 2016, the
EcoPC was formally discontinued (EcoPC 2016).13
Although the EcoPC has been shut down,
the ELI has, throughout the writing of this
paper, continued to host the EcoPC website at
ecopatentcommons.org. In addition, pursuant
to the EcoPC ground rules and pledge terms, the
“irrevocable” non-assertion pledge made with
respect to each pledged patent will continue
in accordance with its terms indefinitely.14

13 Based on the interviews described in the “Findings” section, below, the
authors understand that each EcoPC participant was consulted by IBM
regarding the decision to wind down the EcoPC. Apparently, there was
no resistance to this course of action.
14 The ground rules make it clear that a patent owner’s EcoPC pledge
will survive that owner’s withdrawal from the EcoPC (EcoPC 2013a):
“Voluntary or involuntary withdrawal shall not affect the non-assert as to
any approved pledged patent(s) — the non-assert survives and remains
in force.” For example, Hitachi pledged a patent to the EcoPC in 2011,
but withdrew from the EcoPC in 2013. This patent should remain pledged.
See Contreras (2015, 598).

Qualitative Analysis
This section of the paper describes the
results of the authors’ interviews of some
of the participants in the EcoPC.

Methodology
Using a series of semi-structured interviews,15
the authors sought to gain an understanding
of the motivations that originally led firms to
participate in the EcoPC, their assessment of
the EcoPC’s strengths and weaknesses during
the course of its operation, and their rationales
for discontinuing the EcoPC in 2016.
As noted in this paper’s introduction, the EcoPC
included 13 corporate participants. It was hosted
by the WBCSD from 2008 to 2013, and by the ELI
from 2013 to 2016. The authors identified individuals
employed by EcoPC corporate participants
who had been personally involved with their
employer’s decision to join the EcoPC and/or its
ongoing participation in the EcoPC. Through online
searches and informal inquiries, current contact
details for representatives of nine of the 13 EcoPC
corporate participants were obtained. Seven of
these individuals consented to be interviewed for
this study (five by telephone and two by written
correspondence).16 In addition, representatives of
the WBCSD and the ELI who were directly involved
in EcoPC activities were interviewed. Interview
scripts differed for individuals representing
EcoPC participants versus administrators. Each
interview lasted approximately 30 to 60 minutes.
Responses were coded by the interviewer. No
compensation was offered to interview subjects.
The authors do not claim that the information
gathered through these interviews is necessarily
representative of the views held by all member
companies of the EcoPC. It is possible that
interviewees agreed to be interviewed based on
their own subjective views of the performance
of the EcoPC (for example, those that had more

15 Interviews were conducted by Jorge Contreras pursuant to a
determination of “no human subject research” by the University of Utah
Institutional Review Board (26 June 2017, IRB 00102447). Interview
subject information is held by Contreras.
16 The authors have agreed not to disclose the identities of either the
individuals interviewed or the EcoPC participant companies that they
represented, with the exception of IBM, given its central role in forming
and managing the EcoPC.
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positive views of the EcoPC may have agreed
to be interviewed). That said, information was
gathered from a relatively diverse sampling
of company representatives (relative to the
number of people involved in the project) across
different geographical regions (companies
based in the United States, Europe and Japan).
The authors are therefore optimistic that these
interviews offer relevant information with
regard to a significant portion of the EcoPC
participants’ views regarding the organization.

Findings
Each interview subject responded to questions
relating to his or her employer’s reasons for
joining the EcoPC, how patents were selected for
inclusion in the EcoPC, the company’s ongoing
engagement with the EcoPC, views regarding the
discontinuation of the EcoPC, the company’s overall
satisfaction with the EcoPC, whether the company’s
goals in joining the EcoPC were achieved, and
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the
EcoPC structure. In addition, representatives of
the WBCSD and the ELI were asked questions
relating to their operation and management of the
EcoPC. These responses are summarized below.

Joining EcoPC
Based on the sample of EcoPC participants
interviewed, it appears that the primary drive to
participate in the EcoPC came from management
within each corporation’s environmental,
sustainability or corporate social responsibility
unit (for convenience, the paper will refer to
such business units as “environmental and
social responsibility” or ESR). Although in most
cases, the corporate legal or IP department
was consulted, it was not the primary internal
champion of participation in the EcoPC. In
several cases, the decision to join the EcoPC
was made by an executive or manager within
the ESR unit, with the legal department being
involved only later (for example, to help
identify suitable patents for contribution).
Given the origin of EcoPC participation in corporate
ESR units, it is not surprising that the rationales
for joining the EcoPC were largely focused on
improving global environmental conditions and

6

sustainability. Several respondents mentioned a
corporate culture of ESR, while a few expressed
a desire to ensure that environmentally valuable
technologies were made available in the
developing world. Responses evoked themes of
environmental preservation and stewardship,
as well as of corporate social responsibility.
With respect to each of the corporate EcoPC
participants other than IBM, the company was
approached directly by a representative of either
IBM or the WBCSD regarding participation
in the EcoPC. In several cases, a personal
relationship at the managerial or executive
level facilitated the decision to participate.
One attractive feature that weighed in favour of
joining the EcoPC was the lack of any financial
commitment on the part of the participants.
The only requirement for EcoPC participation
was the identification and contribution of one
or more patents. Several respondents indicated
that their employers would probably not have
joined the EcoPC had a membership fee been
required. Probably due to the lack of a financial
commitment, the corporate approval required
for joining the EcoPC was, in some cases,
handled at the level of the ESR unit. In at least
one case, however, the company was required to
obtain corporate approval at the board level.
It is interesting to note that none of the individuals
who were interviewed identified a public
relations (PR) benefit as a principal justification
for joining the EcoPC. While several interviewees
acknowledged that positive PR associated with
the EcoPC may have contributed to the decision
to join, in particular at the executive level, the
principal support for EcoPC participation within
firms originated in, and was championed by,
ESR business units with express goals directed
at environmental sustainability. This observation
runs counter to several prior analyses of the
EcoPC, which speculated that PR benefits may
have been significant motivators for firms to join
(Contreras 2015, 591; Van Hoorebeek and Onzivu
2010, 18). Indeed, even the promotional materials
created by the WBCSD to recruit additional EcoPC
members emphasize these PR benefits.17 Yet, it
seems that PR may have played a relatively modest
role in the decision of firms to join the EcoPC.

17 See EcoPC (2013b, 3) listing “global recognition” as the first “benefit” for
member companies that have pledged patents to the EcoPC.
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Selection of Patents
It was a starting premise of most firms that
the patents pledged to the EcoPC would not
be central to the firm’s commercial interests.
In fact, this feature was a “selling point” for
membership in the commons: the patents
that would be contributed were not expected
to “represent an essential source of business
advantage” for their owners (EcoPC 2017).
The manner in which specific patents were
selected for contribution to the EcoPC varied
among participants. IBM, reputedly the largest
patent holder in the world, utilized a variety of
internal searching and analysis tools to determine
which of its patents were suitable candidates for
contribution: namely that they fit into the EcoPC’s
approved technology categories and were not
actively being commercialized by IBM. Other firms
used similarly sophisticated patent searching
methodologies, including analysis of external
citations to patent documents, to determine
whether patents had potential financial value.
Some firms, even those with large patent portfolios,
used less formal approaches. In one case, a patent
was identified because a senior environmental
manager at the company was named as an inventor
on it. Another company asked its internal managers
at the product division level to recommend
patents for contribution. At one company, the
majority of patents contributed originated within
the ESR business unit, which championed EcoPC
membership within the company. In all cases,
EcoPC participants selected patents for contribution
through internal mechanisms and did not engage
external consultants or attorneys to assist with
the search or selection process, which also helped
keep the costs of participating in the EcoPC low.

Ongoing Engagement
All respondents indicated that a meaningful,
although not overwhelming, amount of effort was
required at the initiation of EcoPC participation,
largely to identify relevant patents to contribute.
After that initial determination was made, however,
most firms (IBM being the notable exception)
indicated that they engaged very little with the
EcoPC. As noted above, there were occasional
telephone conferences during which participants
were updated regarding the EcoPC’s activities,
but after 2011, when the last new member
joined, there was little in the way of updates. As
noted earlier, none of the individuals that were

interviewed recalled participating in any formal
vote of EcoPC members, even when the decision
to wind down the organization was made. This
being said, most of the respondents did not object
to this minimal level of involvement and did not
feel the need to be involved to a greater degree.

Discontinuation
Each respondent was satisfied with the decision
to wind down the EcoPC, indicating that the
organization had run its course and provided
comparatively little value by the time that it
concluded. None of the respondents expressed
disappointment or disagreement with the decision
to discontinue the EcoPC. In fact, at least three
respondents were unaware, at the time they were
interviewed, that the EcoPC had been discontinued
more than a year earlier, demonstrating that,
at least in these cases, the EcoPC was a fairly
insignificant activity for these companies.

Strengths and Weaknesses
of the EcoPC
Most respondents viewed the EcoPC as a
valuable demonstration of corporate willingness
to collaborate to achieve environmental and
sustainability goals. The PR benefits of EcoPC
participation were viewed as valuable by some
companies. IBM’s efforts at organizing the project
were also commended by several respondents.
However, each of the respondents expressed
dissatisfaction with at least some aspects
of the EcoPC, as described below.
→→ Membership and recruitment: At its height in
2011, the EcoPC had 13 corporate participants.
Although these firms were all major global
enterprises with large patent portfolios, they
still represented only a tiny fraction of the total
potential membership in the organization. In
particular, given that the EcoPC charged no
membership fee, it was somewhat puzzling
that so few firms joined. While the WBCSD
appeared to promote membership in the
EcoPC, few of the WBCSD’s many members
elected to join. Based on interviews with EcoPC
members, the authors believe that possible
impediments to recruitment included the
perceived difficulty and expense of identifying
suitable patents for contribution; a belief
among potential members that they lacked
patents that were suitable for contribution; and
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a general aversion to the idea of contributing
potentially valuable patents to the EcoPC
without compensation, a view generally held
by legal and IP departments, although not
shared by ESR business units. Accordingly,
EcoPC membership may have been limited
to those large firms with ESR business units
having sufficient internal authority, willingness
and social capital to cause their companies
to join an effort viewed, at least initially, with
suspicion by corporate legal departments.
→→ No tracking of usage: All respondents observed
that there was no effective way to determine
whether the technologies covered by patents
pledged to the EcoPC had been utilized.18
As a result, it was difficult for them to draw
conclusions regarding whether the EcoPC was
worth the effort and to determine whether the
goals of improving environmental conditions
and sustainability were being met. Moreover,
without clear success metrics, it was difficult to
justify ongoing participation within the EcoPC
to upper management at some companies.
Several respondents indicated that the EcoPC
made a conscious decision not to require
users to register with the website or report
back to the EcoPC, as it was felt that such
requirements would serve as barriers to use
of the website. Running somewhat counter to
these comments, one interviewee noted that,
in the early phase of the EcoPC, he/she received
informal approaches from potential users
seeking to understand the technology that had
been made available through the EcoPC. This
respondent indicated that during group calls
with EcoPC representatives, they would share
information regarding how many inquiries of
this nature they had received. However, such
informal inquiries dropped off after the initial
years of the EcoPC, which may suggest that the
technologies were no longer perceived as useful.
The WBCSD, at least initially, tracked hits to
the EcoPC website and shared this information
with the participants.19 However, as noted
above, identifying information about visitors
was not collected, and it was not clear whether

18 This weakness was identified by commentators soon after the EcoPC’s
formation (Bowman 2009).
19 The authors analyzed the data on web hits in their earlier study to find
a highly skewed distribution of hits: only 36 patents received any hits.
Nevertheless, the analysis also indicated a positive correlation between
web hits and forward citations by other patents (Hall and Helmers 2013).
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visitors were academics, students, attorneys,
journalists or potential users of technology.
→→ Website not user-friendly: It was noted
by several interview respondents that the
cataloguing of patents on the EcoPC website,
which was organized by contributing
company rather than by technology area, was
not particularly intuitive or informative. It
required potential users to look up the relevant
patents one by one in order to understand the
technology being offered. Moreover, usually
only a single patent family member was listed,
requiring users to identify the remaining
members themselves. This procedure would
have required substantial effort on the part
of potential users, as well as a high degree of
familiarity with the format and terminology
of patent documents.20 Perhaps some form
of usage testing or assessment could have
helped the organizers of the EcoPC make the
technology being offered more accessible
or understandable. As documented by Hall
and Helmers (2013), the website also listed a
number of erroneous patent numbers, another
potential source of frustration for users.
→→ No technology transfer: Another issue raised
by several respondents was that the EcoPC
sought to promote the dissemination of
green technologies through patents alone.
Yet, complex technologies often cannot be
understood and implemented, especially
by non-experts working in the developing
world, exclusively through patent disclosures
(McManis and Contreras 2014). Some form of
technology assistance or transfer is generally
required to enable local users to take advantage
of patented technologies, or even to realize
that such technologies are available and
applicable to local problems. Thus, even with
a more explicit statement describing the
technology covered by the contributed patents,
it is not clear that the EcoPC would have
achieved significant technology transfer. One
of the issues that emerged in this regard was
uncertainty regarding the intended users of
the EcoPC system. Who was expected to read
the EcoPC patents and then employ them in
environmentally friendly technologies? Several
20 It is worth pointing out that this situation is changing rapidly, since Google
patent search now includes members of the patent family in its results.
However, this feature was not available during most of the life of the
EcoPC.

CIGI Papers No. 161 — February 2018 • Jorge L. Contreras, Bronwyn H. Hall and Christian Helmers

of the individuals interviewed believed that
intended users of EcoPC technology would
be from the developing world. However, this
belief evidences a misunderstanding of the
global patent system. Patents prevent usage
of a patented technology only in the countries
where patents are issued. Most companies do
not seek patent protection in the least-developed
countries, either because protection is uncertain
in those countries, or because their markets are
underdeveloped and the cost of procuring patent
protection is not viewed as cost-effective. Even
in middle-income countries, multinationals
tend to focus on pharmaceutical patenting and
patenting in specific areas where the country
in question is competitive (Hall and Helmers
2017; Abud et al. 2013). Accordingly, many
technologies that are patented in the developed
world are not patented in the developing world.
This general rule certainly applies to the patents
contributed to the EcoPC, most of which have
“family” members throughout the developed
world, such as North America, Europe and Asia
Pacific, but few, if any, patent family members
in the developing world. Thus, organizations
in the developing world already have the right
to seek to exploit many technologies disclosed
in patents filed in the developed world. But
they do not do so because, as discussed above,
the utilization of even moderately complex
technologies is not possible without significant
training and technology transfer activity that is
not accomplished through the grant of patent
rights alone. In addition, technologies patented
in the developed world may not be targeted to
needs in the developing world without extensive
further development. Ironically, the entities
that would have most benefited from the nonassertion covenants made by EcoPC members
were sophisticated firms in developed countries.
At least one representative acknowledged
this, noting that the most likely user of some
of the company’s contributed patents would
be environmental service companies. Yet
because the EcoPC made no concerted outreach
to promote the availability of contributed
technologies, even sophisticated firms were
unlikely to find and use these technologies.
→→ Shift in corporate priorities: Several interview
respondents noted that internal corporate
support for ESR initiatives within their own
companies had flagged during the life of
the EcoPC, and that budgetary and resource

constraints had resulted in a de-emphasis
of ESR initiatives within their corporate
organizations. Some speculated that these
industry-wide trends may have affected the
willingness of new members to join the EcoPC.

Data
For the purpose of the authors’ quantitative analysis
in the section, below, they updated the database
used in Hall and Helmers (2013). This means that
for comparison purposes, the authors restricted
the set of patents to all patents pledged prior to
July 2010, which excludes the four patent families
pledged by Hewlett-Packard and Hitachi.21 The
authors also included the original control patents,
which had been obtained by matching on priority
year, IPC subclass and publication authority.
Updating the data turned out to be somewhat
complicated, partly because the original data
was drawn from a European Patent Office (EPO)
Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT)
version with non-permanent identifiers, and partly
because PATSTAT itself changes over time, with
some data disappearing due to changes in data
at the contributing national or regional patent
offices. In addition, the list of patents on the EcoPC
website appears to have changed slightly, to some
extent in response to the authors’ comments on the
original list (incorrect numbers, etc.). The authors
used the April 2017 PATSTAT version and identified
a correspondence between the prior identifying
numbers and the permanent (as of April 2011)
identifiers using information on the application
number and authority of the relevant patents. In
a few cases, the authors were unable to find the
application number/authority combination on
the new version of PATSTAT. There were four such
applications from the Japan Patent Office (JPO),
which apparently have been withdrawn and are no

21 In the case of the Hitachi patent, it is not clear that the patent was ever
listed on the EcoPC’s public website. All versions of the EcoPC’s list of
patents that the authors were able to locate using web archive tools were
current only as of May 2011, prior to Hitachi’s joining.
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Table 2: Data Set Construction
Old (2011 Data)

New (2017 Data)

711

698

Controls

473

461

Eco-patents

238

237

184

184

Controls

94

94

Eco-patents

90

90

1,872

4,056

1,205

2,713

667

1,343

Number of Applications

Number of Equivalence Groups

Number of Citations
Controls
Eco-patents
Source: Authors.

longer on its website.22 The authors included them
in their forward citation analysis as having zero
cites, for completeness. In addition, 24 applications
from the Australian Patent Office (APO) were
reduced to 12 applications in the new PATSTAT file.
The resulting data set contains 698 applications
rather than the original 711, with the following
distribution: From Table 2, one can see that
although the set of applications has changed
slightly, the same number of equivalent groups
for the patents have to be analyzed. It is also
clear that the number of citations to both the
EcoPC patents and the controls have grown
considerably, more than doubling in both cases.

22 One problem with searching for JPO patents, especially the earlier ones,
is that the numbering systems are quite complex and some numbers are
apparently reused occasionally (for further information on Japanese
patent numbering, see Prior Art, “Tips of Performing Japanese Patent
Numbers Search”, online: <www.searchpriorart.com/search_tips/patent_
no_search.htm>). This problem leads to apparent errors on the Espacenet
and Google patents websites. The authors also found that at least two of
the equivalent patents they had identified for the controls became utility
model patents when they were granted in Japan.
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Empirical Results
Next, the authors used the data on patents
pledged to the EcoPC and their matched controls
to analyze, first, the legal status of EcoPC patents,
to gauge whether member companies considered
continued ownership of their pledged patents
as sufficiently important to incur the associated
costs, and, second, the diffusion of the technologies
protected by patents pledged to the EcoPC, as
measured by citations received from other patents.

Legal Status of the Pledged Patents
The authors began by looking at the legal status
of the EcoPC pledged patents as of July 2017,
summarized in Table 3. This data was collected
from PATSTAT’s legal status tables from April
2017 and supplemented with information from
web searches. The World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Patent Cooperation Treaty
patents in the authors’ database do not have a
post-grant legal status since they are granted on a
national basis, and a few patent applications from
the JPO could not be found, probably because
the PATSTAT entries were for translations, or they
were utility model applications in Japan, even
though they might have been patent applications
elsewhere. There are 15 such patents for which
the authors do not have legal status either, or
legal status is meaningless. Of the remaining 221
patent applications, almost 20 percent of the 90
priority patents were still in force as of July 2017,
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Table 3: Legal Status of Eco-patents — July 2017
All

Priority

All

Priority

Pending

8

3

3.4%

3.3%

Granted and in Force

19

14

8.1%

15.6%

27

17

11.4%

18.9%

Nonpayment of Fees

90

29

38.1%

32.2%

Expired at Term

61

30

25.8%

33.3%

Rejected

18

7

7.6%

7.8%

Withdrawn

24

7

10.2%

7.8%

Total Not Active

193

73

81.8%

81.1%

Missing (from JPO)*

5

0

2.1%

0.0%

WIPO Applications

11

0

4.7%

0.0%

236

90

Total Still Active

Total

* These appear to be translation entries or utility models.
Source: Authors.

but only 11 percent of all the equivalent patents
were still in force. Of the 27 patents still in force or
pending, 12 are US patents, six are Japanese, four
are European Patent or German, and the remainder
are Chinese (one), Russian (two), Mexican (one)
and Korean (one). Almost half the patents have
expired for nonpayment of fees, although almost
as many expired at the end of their terms.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of patent
lifetimes (approximated by the lapse [expiration
or nonpayment] dates minus the application
filing date).23 In the case of patents still in force,
the authors measured the lifetime to July 2017.
The distribution is fairly flat for those patents
that did not remain in force for their full terms.
Figure 2 breaks down the different reasons why
patents lapsed. It shows that a significant number
of patents have expired since 2007. A few patents
were rejected by the relevant patent offices or
were withdrawn by applicants, but the majority
lapsed due to nonpayment of renewal fees.
Table 4 (right) shows the geographic coverage of
the EcoPC patents. Ninety percent of the priority

23 Most offices now have a common patent term of 20 years from filing date,
but there are various exceptions, and older patents in the authors’ sample
may have been issued under different rules. When the authors were able to
obtain the actual expiration date, they used that (in most cases).

patent applications were made to the four most
important jurisdictions: the United States, Germany,
Japan and the EPO, and these jurisdictions account
for 80 percent of the patents overall. There is very
little evidence that the patents in the commons
ever covered less-developed countries. The only
patents in middle-income countries are in Brazil
(seven), Mexico (four) and Argentina (one), and
there are none in low-income countries. So,
patents cannot have been an obstacle to the use of
these technologies in less-developed countries.

Technology Diffusion and
Follow-on Innovation
Next, the authors re-examine the question of
technology diffusion by looking at the updated
citation data. Table 5, below, shows the authors’
updated version of data from Table 6 in Hall and
Helmers (2013). As indicated earlier, there are
slightly fewer equivalents of the EcoPC patents and
controls due to missing data and the consolidation
at the APO. The share of patents that have citations
has increased, approaching close to 90 percent for
the equivalence groups, and the average citations
per equivalence group have more than doubled.
None of these results are unexpected, given the
additional five years of data, as well as probable
improvements in the PATSTAT coverage itself.
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Figure 1: Cites per Patent by Citing Year (as of May 2017)
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Source: Authors.

Figure 2: Cites per Patent by Citing Year (as of May 2017)
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2013

2015

2017

Table 4: Application Authority Distribution
Authority

Priorities

All

United States

34

75

Germany

20

45

Japan

17

34

EPO

10

34

South Korea

2

7

China

2

3

Austria

1

4

Spain

1

4

United Kingdom

1

2

Norway

1

2

Denmark

1

1

Brazil

7

Canada

7

Mexico

4

Australia

1

Russia

2

Argentina

1

France

1

Hong Kong

1

Israel

1

Total

90

237

Source: Authors.

Table 6 and Figure 3, below, show the key results
of the authors’ new analysis. The results are
essentially the same as in the authors’ 2013 paper,
but much more precisely estimated. Poisson
and negative binomial models of citations at the
patent level show that EcoPC patents are half
as likely to be cited as the controls (an elasticity
of 0.4–0.6), and even less likely after donation,
although this last result is only marginally
significant. These regressions control for both
priority year and the citation lag using dummies.
The Jaffe-Trajtenberg model of citation decline
and diffusion (Jaffe and Trajtenberg 1999),
shown in the final three columns of Table 3,

uses a parametric model for the citation lag
that is given by the following equation:
Where t is the priority year of the cited patent,
s is the citation lag and cst is the citation rate
(the number of citations at that lag per sample
patents available to be cited). f(t) is modelled as
a set of priority year dummies. That is, the unit
of observation is the average cites per patents
with a given priority year, citation lag and patent
type (EcoPC patent before and after or control).
Prior experience with this specification suggests
that although it is an appealing model in that it
captures both the initial increase in citation due
to knowledge diffusion and the decline due to
knowledge age, it is quite difficult to estimate
successfully (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001). The
authors accomplish this in two ways: non-linear
least squares with a dependent variable equal
to average cites per patent; and Poisson with a
dependent variable equal to the total cites at the
given lag to patents with a given priority year. In
the latter case, the authors multiply the right side
of the model by the number of patents, so the
models are equivalent. The results from the two
estimation strategies are similar. Once the authors
impose a model on the citation lag, the EcoPC
patents are cited an average of 25 percent less than
the controls, and there is no change after donation.
The decay (obsolescence) and diffusion parameters
are similar to those obtained by Hall et al (2001) for
the US patent data, with obsolescence increasing
by about five percent per year, and diffusion by
about 50 percent. However, keep in mind that
one reason the first parameter is relatively low
and the second relatively high is that there is a
secular growth in citation that is not completely
captured by the priority year dummies. That is, this
model imposes a fixed citation lag structure on the
data, which is then allowed to be higher or lower,
depending on priority year and EcoPC status.
Table 6 and Figure 3 show that there is little
change in aggregate citation differences between
EcoPC patents and controls before and after
being pledged to the commons, although EcoPC
patents are cited less overall. One thing that is
important to remember, however, is that because
the pledging firms retain a defensive termination
right, there may be continuing innovation building
on these patents that does not result in new patent
applications (and citations). That is, there are limits
created on the enforcement of patent rights by the

cst = b0 (1 + deco Deco + dafter Dafter ) f (t)
exp[- b1(1 + ble Deco)s] [1 - (b2(1+b2e Deco)s)]+est
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Table 5: Citation Counts for EcoPC Patents and Controls
Equivalence
Group

All Patents

Total Patents

All Patents

Equivalence
Group

Share with Citations

All Patents
Total Citations

Eco-patents

237

90

73.0%

85.6%

1,343

Controls

461

94

57.1%

93.6%

2,713

Average Citations*

Average Citations**

Eco-patents

10.5

17.4

5.7

14.9

Controls

13.2

30.8

5.9

28.9

Total

236

90

Citations are measured as all forward citations in the patent literature between the application date and April/May 2017,
adjusted for citations by equivalent patents in other jurisdictions.
* Average over patents with nonzero citations.
** Average over all patents
Source: Authors

Table 6: Estimation of Citation Lag Models
Model

Semi-parametric

Jaffe-Trajtenberg

Dependent Variable
Method

Cites
Poisson

Cites Negative
Binomial

Cites/Patent
NLLS

Cites
Poisson

EcoPC Patents

-0.60 (0.11)***

-0.42 (0.10)***

-0.33 (0.09)*** -0.22 (0.04)***

-0.25 (0.05)***

EcoPC Patents
after Donation

-0.35 (0.21)

-0.33 (0.17)*

-0.10 (0.18)

-0.01 (0.08)

0.01 (0.08)

Decay Parameter

0.07 (0.02)***

0.04 (0.01)***

0.05 (0.01)***

Diffusion Parameter

0.49 (0.21)**

0.76 (0.19)***

0.64 (0.21)***

EcoPC Decay

Cites
Poisson

0.47 (0.38)

Dispersion Parameter

3.21 (0.17)***

Citations Lag Dummies

yes

yes

no

no

no

Priority Year Dummies

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Observations
Log Likelihood

3,071
-6,143.0

3,071
-3,745.2

518
-845.6

518
12,062.8

518
12,068.6

Sample: 94 controls and 90 EcoPC patents with priority years between 1992 and 2005 and citing years between 1992
and 2016. The unit of observation in the first two columns is a priority patent-citing year and in the next three columns
a priority year-citing year. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significant at the one per cent (***), five per
cent (**) and 10 percent (*) levels.
Source: Authors.
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Figure 3: Cites per Patent by Citing Year (as of May 2017)
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Source: Authors.

Table 7: Citation to the Eco-patents by Citer Type
Unweighted
Firm

Before
Donation

After
Donation

Weighted

Share
Before

Share
After

Before
Donation

After
Donation

Share
Before

Before
Donation

Self-citation

141

24

9.9%

4.6%

127.1

12.9

12.3%

3.9%

Other Ecopatent Firm

11

13

0.8%

2.5%

8.0

7.3

0.8%

2.2%

Other Firm

645

248

45.1%

47.1%

627.5

229.8

60.5%

68.8%

Individual

589

219

41.2%

41.6%

243.0

71.7

23.4%

21.5%

Institution

43

22

3.0%

4.2%

31.7

12.4

3.1%

3.7%

1,429

526

1,037.3

334.1

Total

These totals are for cites to the contributed eco-patents only. Weighted cites are weighted according to the number of
applicants.
Source: Authors.
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firms that use the technologies in these patents,
which may reduce the benefits of subsequent
patenting, and thus reduce citations to the pledged
patent. This issue is related to a broader problem: the
authors’ analysis of diffusion only looks for diffusion
that leads to follow-on innovation that is patented.
This excludes simple use of pledged patented
technologies and even of follow-on innovation if
it does not lead to a patent filing. However, in the
absence of any information on the use of pledged
patents (see the discussion above), the forward
citation analysis offers an opportunity to assess
the impact of the patent pledge on diffusion.

patent.24 Although the distribution of cites changes
dramatically when the authors weight, due to the
tendency of individuals to share in applications,
the qualitative conclusions with respect to the
post-commons citing behaviour are the same.

It is also possible that the nature of the citation
changes, in that the technology in the patents
becomes more useful to individuals and nonprofit institutions, given the absence of royalty
requirements. The authors investigate this question
by looking at the source of the citations to the EcoPC
patents and controls before and after donation.
They divide the cites into five groupings according
to their source: self-citations from the firm that
owns the pledged patent, citations from other
EcoPC participants, citations from other firms,
citations from individual patentees, and citations
from non-profit institutions (universities, hospitals,
public research organizations and governments).
The authors then define the before and after
period for each grouping of citations according
to the relation between the earliest priority date
for the citing patent and the date the cited patent
was donated to the commons. The results are
shown in Table 7. In some cases, sample sizes
are fairly small, but it appears that self-citation
falls relative to all the other categories, with the
largest (percentage) increases in citations by other
EcoPC participants and non-profit institutions.

The authors summarize here what they have
learned from the experience of this patent commons
and related work on knowledge transfer.

One issue that arises when counting the source
of citations is that many patents have multiple
applicants of different types. Given the non-rivalry
of knowledge, which implies that one citer’s use of
the knowledge in a patent does not depend on use
by another citer, it might be appropriate to simply
count all the applicant citations as citations (as in
the first panel of Table 6). Nevertheless, the authors
also show a weighted version of the table in the
second panel, where the weights are proportional to
the inverse of the number of applicants on the citing

Conclusion: Lessons for a
(Green) Patent Commons

→→ The EcoPC was conceived and implemented by
the suppliers of technology without consulting
the demand side (potential users of these
patents/technologies). As such, the EcoPC was
constructed in a way that was not easy for users
to consume. More outreach and technology
transfer assistance is probably needed, or
perhaps a way to simply tell potential users
about the technologies that are available (other
than a passive website with patent listings).25
→→ Related to the previous point, the EcoPC was
organized as a volunteer effort. Members paid
no fees, and the WBCSD and the ELI participated
largely as an accommodation to IBM. Without
payment, there are not likely to be many ancillary
value-added services. This being said, some
members stated that they would not have joined
had they been required to pay a membership fee.
So, there is a clear trade-off, or perhaps a need for
public support or a tax incentive, if the activity is
viewed as socially desirable. This also means that
the ability to distribute the fixed costs associated
with managing such an institution favours an
approach that brings together a larger number
of participating companies than the EcoPC did.
→→ Low membership can be attributed, in part, to
the cost of the internal patent analysis that was

24 The authors removed individual inventor applicants where there was also
a firm applicant before computing the weights, on the grounds that these
applicants usually are employed by the firm in question.
25 A similar supply-side model for patents can be found in the IPXI Exchange,
an attempt to offer unitized licences of pooled patents essential to certain
industry standards. Like the EcoPC, the IPXI failed to achieve significant
take-up and eventually discontinued its operations. See Contreras (2016).
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required to contribute. Several of the original
EcoPC participants were large, sophisticated
organizations with internal patent analytical
resources and a clear understanding of
which patents would, or would not, advance
corporate goals. Did other firms feel that they
did not want to risk giving away a patent
that could have potential value? Or was the
internal effort of identifying these patents,
without a clear payoff, seen as not worth
the effort for overworked patent counsel?
→→ Low membership in the EcoPC may also be
attributable to the lack of a formal membership
recruitment campaign, which is likely due to
the lack of any independent funding for the
EcoPC. Most trade associations have dedicated
personnel for membership development,
and enrolling members takes significant
time and effort.26 Without these resources, it
is not surprising that the EcoPC was unable
to recruit a larger body of members.
→→ The most common critique of the EcoPC was its
lack of tracking of patent utilization. Without
knowledge of how or whether patents were being
utilized, companies could not justify expending
further effort on the activity. Moreover, even
the PR benefit of belonging to the EcoPC waned
after the initial contributions, given that there
were no “success stories” to promote. More
generally, the lack of information on usage meant
that it was very difficult to gauge the success
of the initiative and to make adjustments to
its structure and management to improve its
performance. Finally, the lack of demonstrable
results from the project eroded the potential PR
benefits that member firms may have hoped
to achieve from participation in the EcoPC.
→→ Effective technology diffusion requires more
than patent non-assertion, especially in the
developing world. Technical assistance and
know-how are essential for environmental
technologies far more than they are for software
or pharmaceuticals (Barton et al. 2002; McManis
and Contreras, 2014). Patent disclosures
alone are not sufficient to enable someone to
implement a technology (see Ouellette [2012]
for the results of a survey of patent readers).

26 Ibid, relating to the failed IPXI effort.

→→ Several interview respondents expressed
disappointment with a general trend within
the industry and their own companies to less
aggressively pursue ESR goals and programs
over the course of the EcoPC project. This
trend, which the authors have only anecdotal
evidence to support, may have contributed to
the lack of enrolment of new members in the
EcoPC. If this is the case, then new commons
efforts in the environmental space will need
to develop strategies to rekindle corporate
interest in ESR and green technology solutions.
→→ The results of the empirical analysis suggest
fairly strongly that the technologies covered
by the contributed patents were in fact not
very valuable, even before contribution to
the commons. In addition to the citation
evidence, this view is supported by the fall off
in inquiries from others. These observations
suggest that future commons efforts may
benefit from the contribution of patents that
have a greater inherent value, at least to the
markets that they are intended to benefit, and
that contributors may benefit the commons
by more specifically identifying potential
applications for contributed patents.
Future initiatives seeking to make green
technologies more widely available should consider
the lessons learned from the EcoPC. There are
clear trade-offs between costs and benefits that
organizers of future efforts need to consider. The
experience of the EcoPC, even though it may not
have fully realized its ambitious goals, has helped
to advance our understanding of how patent
commons can work and fail to work. As such,
the EcoPC has made an undeniable contribution
to the study of patent commons and pledges.
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